William Alston and mystical experience

Alston begins his argument by making the case that even our basic sense perceptions have no epistemological basis.  He argues that the only way to prove sense perceptions reliable is by arguing in a circular manner in which the premise is justified by itself.  Alston refers to this as “epistemic circularity” and claims that since something as trusted as sense perceptions can be shown to be logically unreliable; it cannot be argued that mystical perceptions are unreliable on the same grounds. 

In rejecting sense perception as a reliable means for drawing conclusions, Alston instead proposes a doxastic approach in which one builds on his/her beliefs through a combination of perceptual inputs and belief outputs.  As one experiences new things they perceive (inputs) events and things which translate into beliefs (outputs).  By holding to this epistemological view, Alston is logically justified in claiming no difference between the perception of a tree and a mystical perception.  If one accepts doxastic practices as the most effective means of obtaining reliable beliefs than there is no logical reason to value one perception over another.

This idea that all perceptions are equally valuable is also the main flaw in this argument.  If one accepts that all perceptions are equally reliable then we have no reason to value one belief over another.  In tangible terms, there is no reason to accept Islam as more true than Christianity based on mystical experience.  Furthermore, based on this reasoning, there is no way to determine truth when two mystical experiences contradict one another as most all do.  Various religions worldwide offer vastly different experiences, each equally established in their societies.  If these experiences represented objective truth it would reason that the majority would agree with one another; this is not the case. 

The most rational way to deal with this apparent discrepancy is to assume that these experiences (perceptions) are nothing more than products of the minds of those who experience them.  This would account for both the variety and quantity of mystical experiences.  Alston offers a less than satisfactory answer here suggesting that since one has no logical reason to change beliefs, one should continue in whatever tradition they were first introduced to.  This is as if to say since you first believed in Santa, it is necessary to continue in this belief despite evidence to the contrary.  Such evidence includes science, historical record, and philosophical reasoning.  Alston’s argument fails to provide a rational basis for the reliability of mystical experience in providing answers to the Ultimate.